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The electric vehicle’s history
offers a lesson to the wise:
Harvesting the fruits of basic
science requires industrial
foresight, investment, and a
healthy dose of realpolitik.
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Then came the lithium-ion ba!ery. (See the article by Héctor
Abruña, Yasuyuki Kiya, and Jay Henderson, PHYSICS TODAY, De-
cember 2008, page 43.) With higher energy density than older
rechargeables—and with the ability to release that energy
quickly on demand—the ba!ery is widely viewed as having
led a revival of the electric vehicle. Tesla Motors pioneered its
use in automobiles with the Roadster, and today most all-electric
vehicles have ba!eries that use some sort of lithium chemistry.
Although concerns about safety, cost, and durability linger, few
would dispute that the lithium-ion ba!ery has been the chief
technological enabler of the renaissance of the all-electric vehicle.
The emergence of the lithium-ion ba!ery did not happen
overnight. It was shaped for decades by the influence of mate-
rials scientists. It was the product not of a singular eureka mo-
ment but of many strands of research tracing back to the rise
of the US national security state at the dawn of the Cold War.
That’s when John Goodenough, a physicist by training, found
himself helping to build a sophisticated air-defense computer
for the US military. Although he couldn’t have imagined it at
the time, he was about to embark on research that would help
found solid-state ionics—the science of inserting and storing ions
inside solids without changing their fundamental structures—
and contribute to revolutionizing automobile transport.
The many twists and turns that ensued illustrate the unpre-
dictability and contingency of innovation. The story of the long
road to lithium-ion power shows how changing social, eco-
nomic, and environmental conditions a"er World War II al-
tered the R&D priorities of government and industry. It aﬀords
insight into how trends in the energy economy shaped science
and engineering over time. And it reveals a hidden history of
the shi"ing fortunes of physics, a discipline that has tradition-
ally relied on state patronage.
The Lincoln years 
Solid-state ionics, the science underpinning lithium-ion tech-
nology, can be interpreted as a byproduct of Project Lincoln,
the US Air Force’s eﬀort to 
develop the Semi-Automatic
Ground Environment, America’s
first air-defense system. In 1952,
at the age of 30, Goodenough
joined MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory,
an institution then at the lead-
ing edge of engineering research
in radar, telecommunications,
and digital computers.
Possessing a doctorate in
theoretical solid-state physics
from the University of Chicago, Goodenough worked in the
unit responsible for the memory of the Whirlwind computer,
the brains of the air-defense system. There, under the leader-
ship of superstar researcher Jay Forrester, he explored the elec-
tronic properties of ceramics and metal oxides.
Over the course of Project Lincoln, Goodenough became an
expert in those materials and, in particular, oxide minerals
known as spinels, which have the form A2+B2
3+O4
2−. He devel-
oped an interdisciplinary research agenda and a style of work
that straddled basic and applied sciences. Motivated by funda-
mental questions of solid-state science and materials design,
Goodenough was guided by what he referred to as engineering
targets, or theoretical problems arising from devices. A"er
identifying a target, he would design experiments for chemists
to execute. 
Occasionally, Goodenough’s research brought him into con-
versation with ba!ery technologists, who in the late 1960s were
experiencing something of a resurgence. For most of the 20th
century, ba!ery makers had stuck to proven and profitable
chemistries—namely, lead–acid ba!eries, invented in 1859 by
French physicist Gaston Planté, and nickel–cadmium ba!eries,
invented in 1899 by Swedish engineer Waldemar Jungner. 
For a brief period in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
electric vehicles powered by lead–acid ba!eries were an impor-
tant component of the light-duty automobile fleet. Such vehi-
cles had relatively short range, but in densely populated, com-
pact eastern cities with good electrical infrastructure, that wasn’t
necessarily a handicap. Many urbanites viewed the electric
“city car” as superior to the noisy, smelly, and fragile internal
combustion vehicle of the day. 
The comparative advantage rapidly disappeared as indus-
try, led by the Ford Motor Co, developed reliable gasoline ve-
hicles and began producing them on a massive scale in the late
1910s and especially a"er World War I. The lead–acid ba!ery
was relegated to the secondary role of starting the motors and
powering the lights of gasoline vehicles. Automobile engineers,
B y 2004 the all-electric vehicle seemed destined for the dustbin ofhistory. General Motors (GM) was recalling and destroying allcopies of the EV1, its first-generation electric car, after companyofficials convinced themselves and regulators that fuel cells, notbatteries, were the ultimate power source of the future electric car.
Meanwhile, hybrid electrics had begun to proliferate as a more economically
viable alternative in the short run. Most batteries were then considered simply
too expensive, too heavy, and too weak to power cars on their own.
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as historian Richard Schallenberg observed, stopped thinking
in terms of electrochemistry.1
The rise of solid-state ionics
For decades a"erwards, ba!ery technoscience languished. In
the Cold War era, only US federal institutions were willing to
procure powerful advanced ba!eries, mainly for highly spe-
cialized military applications. Industry’s economic interest in
advanced ba!eries was marginal. Nevertheless, the emergence
of the conjoined energy and environmental crises in the last
quarter of the 20th century created justifications for corpora-
tions to dabble in power-source research. 
One such program, conducted, ironically, in the research
laboratories of Ford—the company that had done perhaps
more than any other to sweep the electric automobile from
American roads—yielded a ba!ery that would change the
course of Goodenough’s research and upend the conventional
paradigm of power-source technology. 
The ba!ery, developed in 1966–67 by Joseph Kummer and
Neill Weber, functioned on the same basic principle as every
ba!ery before and a"er it: During discharge, an oxidation re-
action at the negative electrode, the anode, liberates electrons
from their parent atoms; the electrons and the ions they leave
behind then travel separate paths—the electrons through an
external circuit to do work, the ions through an electrolyte.
They then recombine via a reduction reaction at the positive
electrode, the cathode. (See figure 1.) During recharging, the
polarity and the process are reversed: The cathode becomes
negative, the anode becomes positive, and the anodic materials
are reconstituted.
Whereas a conventional ba!ery contains solid electrodes
and a liquid electrolyte, Kummer and Weber’s ba!ery featured
liquid electrodes—a molten sodium anode and a molten sulfur
cathode—and a solid ceramic electrolyte known as beta-alumina.
Beta-alumina contained spinels and had previously been used
mainly as industrial furnace insulation. But the compound also
served as an ion conductor when used as an electrolyte. That
hitherto unknown property of what had pre viously been con-
sidered a prosaic material would create a scientific sensation. 
Because Goodenough had become an authority on spinels
during his time at Lincoln Laboratory, he was asked by the
Atomic Energy Commission to evaluate the technology. Like
all molten-salt ba!eries, the sodium–sulfur system had serious
practical problems issuing from its relatively high 350 °C op-
erating temperature. One of the chief issues was corrosion.
Moreover, if the molten electrodes breached containment, the
ba!ery would almost certainly trigger a fire or, worse, an ex-
plosion. Ford made no plans to commercialize the technology.
Still, historians Hervé Arribart and Bernade!e Bensaude-
Vincent credit the technology with stimulating study of the re-
versible insertion of ions into solids, a major shi" in thinking
at a time when electrochemists believed that reactions occurred
primarily at the electrode surface.2
Opportunities in crises
The late 1960s and early 1970s brought energy and environ-
mental crises that renewed US interest in nonnuclear power
sources and shi"ed the R&D priorities of government and in-
dustry. For Goodenough, that meant new engineering targets.
At the time, he had been exploring zirconia-based solids as
possible electrolytes for solid oxide fuel cells (SOFCs), then re-
garded in some quarters as the ultimate power source. Whereas
a ba!ery’s energy is stored in its electrodes, a fuel cell converts
the energy in externally stored fuels by electro-oxidizing their
hydrogen. Researchers were excited by the possibility that the
technology could directly use the H2 bound up in cheap and
dirty carbonaceous substances such as diesel, kerosene, and
gasoline. (See the article by Joan Ogden, PHYSICS TODAY, April
2002, page 69.)
In practice, most fuel cells worked well only on costly clean
fuels—usually pure H2 or, in some variants, natural gas. But
the SOFC, first developed in the late 1930s, was, in principle,
capable of directly using the dirtiest fuels. The SOFC also 
obviated the limitations of water-based electrolytes. Water 
decomposes into oxygen and hydrogen at 1.23 V, which con-
strains ba!eries with aqueous electrolytes to operating at rela-
tively low power. The trade-oﬀ was that the SOFC operated at
1000 °C. Like all high-temperature power sources, it was slow
to start and prone to corrosion.
Enter M. Stanley Whi!ingham, then a chemist at Exxon’s re-
search and engineering division. In the wake of the OPEC em-
bargo of October 1973 and the accompanying spike in oil
prices, the company synonymous with the fossil-fuel order had
to consider the possibility that automakers might be forced to
build electric vehicles. It was in that context that Whi!ingham,
aware of the problems of SOFCs, began to consider the virtues
of low-temperature, nonaqueous electrolytes. In 1976 he in-
vented the lithium titanium disulfide ba!ery, which employed
a liquid organic electrolyte, lithium hexafluorophosphate dis-
solved in propylene carbonate, at ambient temperature.3 Whit-
tingham definitively demonstrated that lithium ions could be
reversibly inserted into the spaces between the sheet-like layers
of the titanium disulfide cathode. The reversible storage of ions
in a layered structure, known as intercalation, is the fundamen-
tal operating principle of a rechargeable lithium ba!ery. 
Whi!ingham’s achievement marked a major advance in
power-source technoscience. At the time, Whi!ingham sug-
gested that he had developed a practical ba!ery, but that was
not quite the case. A"er focusing his eﬀorts on developing the
titanium disulfide cathode, Whi!ingham paired the cathode
with a metallic lithium anode for his proof-of-concept tests. It
was a dangerous combination. When such a cell was repeat-
edly recharged, lithium ions plated unevenly on the anode,
forming tree-like growths called dendrites (see figure 2) that
could bridge the electrodes and cause a short circuit. In such
circumstances, the organic electrolyte can ignite and the bat-
tery eﬀectively becomes an incendiary.
Building a better cathode
Whi!ingham’s lithium titanium disulfide ba!ery would nev-
ertheless inspire perhaps the most important engineering tar-
get of Goodenough’s career—one that would be instrumental
in the creation of the first practical lithium-ion rechargeable
ba!ery. 
Goodenough pondered the problems of lithium titanium
disulfide at Oxford University, where he had accepted an oﬀer
to chair the school’s inorganic chemistry laboratory in 1976.
Like Whi!ingham, Goodenough favored power as the chief
metric of ba!ery performance. He realized that a layered 
sulfide cathode mated to a metallic lithium anode could not
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yield much more than 2.5 V. Paired with a safer anode, he held,
the cathode’s yield would drop further still, to the point that
the device would not be able to compete with existing
rechargeables that used nonflammable aqueous electrolytes.
Because he had no intention of designing a complete ba!ery
for a specific application, he thought about the problem in 
abstract terms and privileged power over safety, cost, and
durability.
Aware of the power limitations of sulfides, Goodenough
looked to metal oxides as potential cathode materials. He
worked with Japanese physicist Koichi Mizushima to deter-
mine how much lithium could be reversibly extracted from
various transition metal oxides. 
Generally speaking, the more ions that can be extracted
from a cathode, the greater the voltage it can deliver. In pro-
tracted experiments, Goodenough, Mizushima, and their col-
leagues showed that when a cobalt oxide cathode was paired
with a metallic lithium anode, they could extract about 60% of
the cathode’s lithium—enough to generate 4 V. They extracted
even more, 80%, from a nickel compound, but that material
was unstable and diﬃcult to prepare.4
Despite his professed interest in basic research, Goodenough
wanted to sell the new cathode. But ba!ery manufacturers
were not interested, because they lacked a suitable safe anode.
Moreover, lithium cobalt oxide was too expensive to be pro-
duced in the quantities needed for electric vehicles. As oil
prices declined through the 1980s, interest in electric vehicles
waned. Low on money, Goodenough patented his cathode
through the UK’s Atomic Energy Research Establishment and
relinquished all of his rights.
That arrangement came back to haunt him when the for-
mula turned out to be well suited to consumer electronics. In
1985 Sony’s Energytec division began working to integrate the
lithium cobalt oxide cathode with a graphite anode developed
in large part through the contributions of Akira Yoshino and
Asahi Kasei Corp. The resulting lithium cobalt oxide recharge-
able ba!eries supplanted the nickel–cadmium ba!ery and be-
came widely used in consumer electronics in the 1990s and
2000s. The patent licensing generated billions of dollars in roy-
alties, of which Goodenough received nothing. 
Still, he had become perhaps the world’s foremost expert on
spinels and lithium-insertion compounds. In the early 1980s,
he a!racted the a!ention of Michael Thackeray, a young South
African chemist for whom the search for a be!er electric auto-
mobile ba!ery would become a life’s work.
An era of energy plenitude
For most of the developed world, the 1980s spelled the return
of cheap oil and the end of the energy crisis. As oil prices de-
clined, the auto industry’s interest in electric vehicles waned.
In oil-poor South Africa, however, the crisis continued, due to
increasing international isolation and a trade embargo pro-
voked by the country’s apartheid policies. South African poli-
cymakers responded by linking science with a semiautarkic in-
dustrial policy emphasizing energy and transportation. In 1977
the country’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) initiated work to develop electric-vehicle (EV) ba!eries,
a project that became known as ZEBRA.
FIGURE 1. A DISCHARGING BATTERY converts chemical potential
into electric potential. At the anode, an oxidation reaction frees
electrons (e−) from their parent atoms. The electrons pass through
an external circuit, where they do work on a load, while the ions
they leave behind diffuse through an electrolyte and separator 
to the cathode. There, the electrons and ions recombine via a 
reduction reaction. During recharging, the process is reversed, and
the anode is restored. In lithium-ion batteries, the electrode materials
are typically layered structures, with lithium stored in the gaps 
between layers.
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Like Whi!ingham, Thackeray began his career considering
the materials problems of high-temperature ba!eries. In the
mid 1970s he was a doctoral student of Johan Coetzer at the
CSIR’s main laboratory in Pretoria. Coetzer had initially sought
to build a safer sodium–sulfur ba!ery by immobilizing its molten
cathode in a porous zeolite matrix. When that configuration
turned out to be too heavy, he instead mated the sodium anode
with an iron chloride cathode, a component he’d developed as
an alternative to the iron sulfide cathode of a hot lithium bat-
tery invented by Argonne National Laboratory. His work led
the CSIR to focus on high temperature (250–350 °C) sodium–
metal chloride chemistries.
As Coetzer worked, Thackeray contemplated metal oxides,
a less corrosive alternative to iron sulfide and iron chloride
cathodes in high-temperature lithium cells. He noted the po-
tential of certain spinels to absorb and release lithium ions, and
he contacted Goodenough and arranged to
work with him at Oxford as a postdoctoral fel-
low. Supported by the CSIR, its aﬃliated South
African Inventions Development Corp, and
mining giant Anglo American, Thackeray
demonstrated the insertion of lithium into two
diﬀerent spinels, magnetite (Fe3O4) and haus-
mannite (Mn3O4), between the fall of 1981 and
the end of 1982.
That research informed Thackeray’s subse-
quent demonstration of lithium insertion into
a manganese oxide cathode. In 1985 Good -
enough and Thackeray patented their research
on the use of spinel frameworks as ba!ery
components. (The patent was assigned to the
South African Inventions Development Corp.) 
Meanwhile, the CSIR had cast its lot with
high-temperature sodium–metal chloride tech-
nology. In 1986, with basic research on those
materials complete, the council transferred
most of its staﬀ to Anglo American. Shortly
therea"er, the mining firm partnered with Daimler-Benz,
which would begin testing sodium–nickel chloride ba!eries in
electric vehicles in the early 1990s.
But interest in electric vehicles remained tepid in the 1980s.
Undeterred, Thackeray and coworkers made a series of im-
provements to manganese oxide cathodes in the early 1990s
with practical applications in mind, even as their support from
the South African government dried up. Their 4 V manganese
oxide cathode tended to distort and dissolve under conditions
of deep discharge, but Thackeray and company found they
could stabilize it by doping it with various metals. They also
developed a spinel anode, made of lithium titanium oxide,
suitable for pairing with the stabilized cathode. In 1993 the
CSIR le" ba!ery research entirely, and in January 1994 Thack-
eray accepted a position in Argonne’s chemical technology 
division, where he continued his work with lithium man-
ganese oxides.5
The politicians and the automakers
Just as political conditions for electric vehicles were diminish-
ing in South Africa, they were ripening in the US. Air-quality
politics in California gave rise in 1990 to the Zero Emission Ve-
hicle (ZEV) mandate. As dra"ed by the California Air Re-
sources Board (CARB), the legislation compelled the big au-
tomakers to produce a rolling quota of ZEVs as a percentage
of overall sales. 
The unprecedented technological mandate provoked fierce
resistance from automakers, who exploited a loophole in the
law: The CARB did not specify the technology by which the
air-quality outcomes were to be achieved, so the auto industry
was able to negotiate the definition of a ZEV. 
At that time, the only practical ZEV was the all-ba!ery elec-
tric car, a technology that automakers adamantly opposed. They
argued consumers would reject it because existing ba!eries
had low energy density and gave short range. The car compa-
nies favored fuel cells, under the logic that the technology
would allow electric vehicles to use common liquid fuels, which
would in turn provide more convenience and longer range
than all-ba!ery electrics.
Auto executives knew, however, that a practical fuel-cell-
powered electric car was still years, if not decades, away. Pack-
aging fuel cells in electric drive trains and ge!ing them to run
on alcohol and gasoline posed severe engineering challenges.
Still, air-quality regulators recognized the fuel-cell electric as a
kind of ZEV and rolled back mandate deadlines in exchange
for an industry promise to commercialize it.
Another option was the hybrid electric. True, the hybrid was
no ZEV, but it posed fewer economic risks than all-ba!ery elec-
tric vehicles. Used day in and day out, even the best ba!eries
will wear out before the electric motors they serve, and that
represents a he"y replacement cost that consumers may not re-
alize. The hybrid was a!ractive in part because it used a smaller
ba!ery and buﬀered it from hard use with a gasoline motor. In
short, the hybrid was a compromise between environmental
politics and industrial- technological exigencies.
The Japanese manufacturers embraced that compromise.
For power, Honda and Toyota looked to the nickel–metal hy-
dride (NiMH) ba!ery, a technology developed by a team at En-
ergy Conversion Devices, the laboratory founded by inde-
pendent American inventor Stanford Ovshinsky. The NiMH
ba!ery used relatively cheap and safe materials, including a
nonflammable aqueous electrolyte, to achieve energy densities
FIGURE 2. DENDRITES, such as the one shown in this
microscope image, were the bane of early lithium-ion
batteries. The tree-like protrusions sometimes bridged
a battery’s electrodes, causing a short circuit that
could potentially trigger a fire. Newer electrode 
materials are designed to mitigate 
dendrite formation. 
(Adapted from ref. 9.)
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of up to 80 Wh/kg, considerably higher than the 30–40 Wh/kg
provided by the best lead–acid EV ba!eries of the day.6
Toyota adopted the technology in a remarkably short time.
Like all automakers, it had no expertise with sophisticated bat-
teries, so it teamed with a Japanese electronics company, Mat-
sushita Electric Industrial, to create the joint venture Panasonic
EV Energy in 1996. One year later the partnership produced a
cylindrical NiMH ba!ery for the Prius passenger automobile.
It infringed on Ovshinsky’s patents in the process, however,
and Matsushita was later forced to pay considerable compen-
sation and licensing fees to Energy Conversion Devices.
Super hybrids and fuel-cell futurism
The American hybrid, on the other hand, was conceived as a
high-performance vehicle—a kind of supercar. Its develop-
ment was crucially shaped by the Partnership for a New Gen-
eration of Vehicles (PNGV), an industry–government collabo-
ration launched by the Clinton administration in 1993 as the
equivalent of the Apollo moon project for advanced automo-
biles. Led by the US Department of Commerce, the PNGV in-
cluded several federal agencies, the most important being the
US Department of Energy, which provided more than half of
the annual $250 million federal commitment. For its part, the
auto industry contributed a further $800 million per year.
The PNGV’s planners insisted that the hybrid ba!ery have
dual operating modes: power assist and pure electric. The power-
assist mode required high power but not necessarily high energy,
since the ba!ery’s average depth of discharge would be relatively
shallow—especially when coupled to internal combustion en-
gines. (Coupled to a fuel cell, which responds sluggishly to de-
mands for power, a power-assist ba!ery would be expected to
discharge more deeply.) But the pure electric mode called for both
high power and high energy. In other words, a dual-mode ba!ery
had to be robust enough to withstand repeated, deep discharges. 
By opting for dual-mode hybrids, the PNGV planners rejected
the premise of the hybrid electric as a compromise technology.
In essence, they were asking the US industry to build what was
essentially a ba!ery electric vehicle—a second-generation hybrid
requiring precisely the sort of super ba!ery that automobile in-
dustry executives insisted they could not quickly develop—at
a time when Japanese manufacturers were well on their way
to commercializing a first-generation hybrid electric. 
The PNGV identified two candidate chemistries for the
dual-mode hybrid: NiMH and lithium ion. The French com-
pany Sa" was the sole contractor for the la!er. For the cathode
material, Sa" selected lithium nickel oxide, believing that the
compound could deliver high power and energy and with-
stand the rigors of repeated recharging, all at low cost. 
Predictably enough, perhaps, given Goodenough’s early ex-
periments with nickel oxides, Sa"’s cathodes didn’t hold up in
long-term tests of charge–discharge cycling. They became dan-
gerously unstable as they aged, which sometimes resulted in
combustion. Researchers had essentially rediscovered the per-
ils of pairing the electrode with a flammable organic electrolyte:
Overcharge, overdischarge, vibration, and other relatively minor
abuses could lead to catastrophe.
With the PNGV’s hybrid EV ba!ery program in trouble,
DOE intervened to help manufacturers understand and ad-
dress lithium nickel oxide’s failure modes. In 1998 it launched
the Advanced Technology Development Program, which funded
research on various so-called ordering elements, introduced to
help prevent nickel ions from escaping the nickel layer. Candi-
dates included cobalt, cobalt and aluminum, manganese and
cobalt, and nickel cobalt aluminum. During the 2000s the Ad-
vanced Technology Development Program would constitute
an important part of the US government’s ba!ery research ef-
forts and influence Panasonic’s work to develop a nickel cobalt
aluminum ba!ery, which the company eventually produced
for Tesla’s Model S sedan. 
In the late 1990s, however, the fuel-cell electric car rapidly
stole the spotlight from hybrids in the US. The PNGV’s spend-
ing on fuel-cell technology began to grow in 1997, and by 
mid 1998 fuel cells had supplanted hybrids as DOE’s top pri-
ority. Around the turn of the millennium, mounting technical 
problems—above all the inability of onboard converters to
quickly crack gasoline or methanol into hydrogen—led 
government and industry researchers to focus on pure-H2
fuel-cell systems. Those technologies became the focus of 
FIGURE 3. GENERAL MOTORS EXECUTIVES and US government 
officials commemorate the first assembled battery for the 2011
Chevrolet Volt. The lithium-ion battery uses manganese oxide electrodes
developed in part by Argonne National Laboratory chemist Michael
Thackeray. Weighing almost 200 kg, it can propel an idle car to 
97 km/h in 9.2 seconds. (Photo by Jeffrey Sauger/General Motors.)
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President George W. Bush’s FreedomCAR, the successor to 
the PNGV.
The lithium electric vehicle
If the idea of the H2 fuel-cell vehicle helped kill the pure ba!ery
electric vehicle, as some critics claimed, it did not stop the pro-
liferation of hybrids powered by NiMH ba!eries. As the Prius
became a familiar sight on US roads, American manufacturers
belatedly realized there was indeed a lucrative market for the
technology. In 2006 GM initiated the Chevrolet Volt project.
Sometimes described as an extended-range EV, the Volt is tech-
nically a dual-mode hybrid. In essence, it was the super hybrid
that the PNGV had failed to deliver.
Robert Lutz, vice chair of GM, characterized the Volt as a
response to both the Prius and the emergence of startup Tesla.
For the all-electric Roadster, Tesla cofounder Martin Eberhard
designed a ba!ery pack using lithium cobalt oxide commodity
electronics cells, the first application of lithium cells in an elec-
tric vehicle. By contrast, GM designed a ba!ery employing
lithium cells expressly intended for vehicle propulsion. 
Two cell chemistries were in the running: one based on man-
ganese oxide developed by LG Chem and a less powerful but safer
system based on iron phosphate designed by Massachuse!s-
based startup A123 Systems. In that competition Thackeray
and Goodenough witnessed the culmination of decades of re-
search on lithium-ion insertion compounds: It was Goodenough
and his doctoral student Ashoka Padhi who first recognized
lithium iron phosphate’s promise as a cathode in the early
1990s, and it was Thackeray who laid the groundwork for man-
ganese oxide cathodes.
In the end, GM selected lithium manganese oxide, a deci-
sion that also validated US federal science; the Volt pack, pic-
tured in figure 3, used components licensed from Argonne. Un-
fortunately for Volt fans, however, the quest for a super EV
delayed the company’s move into hybrids by a crucial decade.
Demand for the Volt was low throughout the recessionary late
2000s and early 2010s, and the lithium-ba!ery manufacturing
plant built with stimulus funds from President Obama’s ad-
ministration initially operated below capacity. 
Lingering questions remain of the social and economic via-
bility of large lithium-ion ba!ery packs such as the Volt’s.
Today’s commercial lithium-ion ba!eries outperform all other
power sources in terms of energy density per weight, with en-
ergy densities typically twice that of nickel–cadmium. But the
ba!eries do not age well and have a short shelf life. 
They also have well-documented safety problems. Some sci-
entists, including materials scientist Robert Huggins, hold that
lithium-ion ba!eries are inherently dangerous because they
use flammable organic electrolytes and they tend to produce
O2 at high voltage.
7 Making such ba!eries safe requires elabo-
rate measures that increase cost and complexity. 
Moreover, the economics of user ownership of EV ba!eries
remain opaque. Currently, most automakers do not produce
their own ba!ery cells and depend heavily on federal and state
assistance to subsidize the high costs of the electric vehicles
they produce. Much of that money, in turn, is captured by bat-
tery cell suppliers like Panasonic and LG Chem.
An electric car for the masses
Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that lithium-ion electric ve-
hicles are here to stay. To be sure, automakers have diﬀerent
philosophies. Tesla selected the most powerful formula—and
the biggest and costliest power packs. The company’s largest
pack can rocket a driver from 0 km/h to 97 km/h in three sec-
onds. Tesla boss Elon Musk hopes to radically cut costs with a
new production facility, the “gigafactory,” currently under con-
struction near Reno, Nevada. But the company faces significant
challenges in delivering the Model 3, touted as an aﬀordable
electric supercar, in times of recession and cheap oil.
Other automakers have been more circumspect. For Toyota,
the hybrid is the electric vehicle of the future and, in a sense,
already the electric vehicle for the masses.8 Toyota alone has
produced more than 8 million hybrids to date, almost all
equipped with iMH ba!eries. The company has also invested
in lithium-ion ba!eries, but cautiously. When Toyota encoun-
tered technical problems introducing lithium technology in the
Prius in 2009–2010, it pragmatically retained NiMH technology
for the regular Prius while using costlier lithium packs for the
plug-in version. Toyota now oﬀers a choice between NiMH and
lithium-ion ba!eries in the baseline Prius. 
The legacy of US public science in the context of electric 
vehicles is mixed. Without question, the government’s environ-
mental regulations and its sponsorship of the materials sci-
ences helped spawn the current revival of electric vehicles. In
one way or another, taxpayer dollars contributed to the devel-
opment of nearly all the major lithium compounds in use
today.
But in developing those compounds, materials researchers
tended to treat ba!eries and fuel cells as materials rather than
parts of complex technological systems. Indeed, for them, the
material largely was the device, and the compounds they and
their patrons found most interesting tended to be the most 
reactive, not necessarily the safest or most durable. Such an 
approach sometimes prevented materials researchers from 
appreciating the physical qualities of power sources in real-
world use.
The US industry largely failed to exploit knowledge gener-
ated by the US physical sciences apparatus. The all-or-nothing
approach to EV technology met with mixed success at best.
And yet among science policymakers—whose political masters
have long been commi!ed to the neoliberal principle of the un-
fe!ered movement of people, capital, and ideas—the belief that
the benefits of national programs of science must necessarily
accrue to domestic manufacturers has unaccountably persisted.
If the history of the lithium-ion ba!ery teaches us anything, it
is that the fruits of science are unlikely to be harvested in the
absence of industrial foresight, investment, and realpolitik.
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